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APPEALABILITY OF CLASS ACTION DETERMINATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The increasing use of the class action' in the federal courts and the
congressional and judicial policy limiting the right to appeal interlocutory
orders 2 have come into conflict when a party seeks immediate appeal from a
district court's determination of whether a class action is appropriate. In
general, interlocutory orders may be considered only on appeal from a final
decision.' However, statutory4 and judicially created 5 exceptions to the final
judgment rule permit interlocutory appeal from district court determinations
under certain circumstances. In order to decide whether the law presently
permits sufficient avenues for appeal, the policies behind the final judgment
rule must be weighed against the consequences of denying review of the class
determination. This Comment will examine the present law on the appealability of a class action determination, and will employ the above balancing
test in order to determine the sufficiency of the present state of the law.
II.

THE DEATH KNELL AND COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINES

The final judgment rule6 limits the jurisdiction of the courts of appeal to
review of final decisions of the district courts. Among the purposes of this rule
are the avoidance of delay which would result from piecemeal review and the
promotion of judicial efficiency. 7 The traditional definition of a final decision
is one "which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court
to do but execute the judgment."'8 However, a rigid application of this
definition can work irreparable harm upon a party without promoting the
desired purpose of efficiency. 9 In recognition of this, the Supreme Court has
I1.In 1974, compared to 1973, the percentage increase in class action cases filed was 2.4%.
1974 Ann. Rep. of the Director, Admin. Office of the United States Courts IX-46.
2. An interlocutory order is one which is not a final decision of the entire controversy. Black's
Law Dictionary 1247 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
3. The final decision rule is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) which provides in relevant
part: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts . .. ."
4. The relevant statutory exceptions discussed herein are: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(a)(1), 1292(b), 1651
(1970), Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see pts. III-VI infra.
5. E.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964) (the "balancing" test);
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (the "collateral order" doctrine);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (the
"death knell" doctrine). See pt. II infra.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). For a complete history of the final judgment rule, see Crick, The
Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539 (1932).
7. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945); Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940).
8. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
9. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Note, The Writ of
Mandamus: A Possible Answer to the Final Judgment Rule, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 1102 (1950); see
note 10 infra for a discussion of Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 200 (1848), an example of
irreparable harm.
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developed various judicial exceptions to the finality rule, the primary one
being the "collateral order" doctrine. 10 The "collateral order" doctrine was
created in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.," a stockholder's
derivative suit, wherein the district court denied defendantes motion to require
plaintiffs to post a bond required by state law to cover defendant's attorney's
fees. Although the district courtfs order did not terminate the entire action, it
was final as to defendant's claimed right to the bond and therefore was
deemed within the final decision rule.' 2 The Court held:
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. The Court has long
13
given this provision of the statute this practical rather than a technical construction.

The doctrine was broadened in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 14
wherein the district court, inter alia, struck from the complaint alleging
negligence under the Jones Act, all reference to the recovery for brothers and
sisters of the decedent. In finding the district court's order "final" for the
purposes of the appeal, the Court applied Cohen's "practical rather than...
technical construction."' 5 Balancing "the inconvenience and costs of
piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay
on the other,"1 6 the Court found that delay in determining the brother's and
sisters' rights might work a great injustice upon them and that their claims,
while not formally severable, could be so viewed for the purpose of determining finality. 17 In addition, the Court found the questions presented to be
"fundamental to the further conduct of the case."' 8
Relying on these precedents, the Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin,19 held that where the denial of a class action certification would be
10. Another important exception was created by the Court in Forgay v.Conrad, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 200 (1848). Forgay involved an appeal of a judgment directing immediate delivery of
property, even though an accounting ordered by the district court had not yet taken place. The
cases following Forgay involved immediate delivery of property, thus causing the possibility of
irremediable injury. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 125-26 n.2 (1945).
They are not relevant to the discussion here.
11. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
12. Id. at 546.
13. Id.
14. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
15. Id.at 152.
16. Id. at 152-53, quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511
(1950).
17. 379 U.S. at 153.
18. Id., quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945).
19. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). The plaintiff, suing on behalf
of himself and a class of as many as 3,750,000 members, alleged that defendants, two major
odd-lot dealers, had conspired to monopolize odd-lot trading and had charged excessive fees in
violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970). The class action allegations were
dismissed by the district court but Mr. Eisen was permitted to proceed on his own. 41 F.R.D.
147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
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the "death knell" of the action, appeal would be allowed. Since plaintiffs
individual claim amounted to $70, Judge Kaufman felt he could "safely
assume that no lawyer of competence [would] undertake this complex and
costly case to recover $70 for Mr. Eisen." 20 In effect, the district court's
dismissal of the class action had terminated the litigation, making its order a
final rather than an interlocutory order. 2' Although the court sought support
in the "balancing test" of Gillespie and the "collateral order" doctrine of
Cohen, the Second Circuit in reality was giving the finality rule the ultimate
"practical rather than technical construction," thereby creating a new doctrine, 22 the "death knell" exception. 23 Although it was hoped that the Supreme Court would rule on the validity of the death knell doctrine, 24 in its
review of theEisen litigation2 5 the Court did not reach the question presented by
20. 370 F.2d at 120.
21. In holding the class action denial appealable, the Second Circuit distinguished its previous
opinions to the contrary. Id. These cases, Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1966)
and All Am. Airways v. Eldred, 209 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1954) were both decided before passage of
amended rule 23. Under the former rule, in a "spurious" class action (Eisen would have been
considered such a class action, 41 F.R.D. 147, 149), class members were required to "opt-in" In
order to be bound by the judgment. Therefore, the dismissal of class action allegations meant that
potential class members would have to intervene rather than "opt-in." Thus, from the point of
view of appealability, the "death knell" question would never arise, since the original plaintiff
was always "on his own" unless others opted in. See Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956, 959
(2d Cir. 1966); Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 99 (1966).
22. The foundation for the doctrine was laid by the Second Circuit in Chabot v. National
Sec. & Research Corp., 290 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1961) where it was held that an order requiring
plaintiffs to post a bond was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, since "the orders, if unreviewed,
will put an end to the action unless plaintiffs abandon their 'claimed right' not to have to furnish
security." 290 F.2d at 659; accord, United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962) where, when a district court's denial of a temporary restraining order
would make the case moot, an appeal of the order was granted by giving the finality rule a
"practical rather than a technical construction." 295 F.2d at 777-78.
23. A number of courts and commentators in deciding on the appealability of a class action
certification, have discussed the collateral order doctrine and death knell exception separately.
E.g., Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3201
(U.S. Oct. 7, 1975); Siebert v. Great N. Dev. Co., 494 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1974); King v. Kansas
City S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Redish, The Pragmatic
Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 89, 93-95 (1975); Note, The
Finality and Appealability of Interlocutory Orders-A Structural Reform Toward Redefinition, 7
Suffolk L. Rev. 1037, 1041, 1054 (1973).
24. E.g., Lerman v. Tenney, 459 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (Friendly, C.J.,
concurring) (motion to dismiss appeal of class action denial denied).
25. Eisen has an eight year history. In 1966, the district court dismissed Mr. Eisen's class
action allegations. 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). Appeal of
this order was granted the same year, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035
(1967) and was decided on the merits in 1968 when the court reversed the class action dismissal.
391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). On remand in 1971, the district court found a class action appropriate
and ordered a preliminary hearing on the merits in order to determine which party would bear the
cost of notice. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417
U.S. 156 (1974). In 1972, asa result of the preliminary hearing, defendants were ordered to bear 90%
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the death knell doctrine, but rather considered the cost
of notice in a class action
26
and where the burden for such costs should lie.
Because of the "overwhelming" number of appeals filed in the federal
courts subsequent to Eisen as well as the possibility of conflict with the
policies behind the final judgment rule,2 7 the Second Circuit set guidelines for
use of the "death knell" doctrine. Generally if a plaintiffs individual claim
approached $10,000, the denial of class action certification would not be
appealable.2 8 The rationale was that, in such a case, the plaintiff would have
sufficient incentive to continue on his own and the denial of certification
would not constitute the "death knell" of the action.2 9 This financial guideline
of the notice cost. 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417
U.S. 156 (1974). The court of appeals reversed the district court in 1973, finding the class
unmanageable. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 414 U.S. 908
(1973), to considerthe issue of notice cost, holding that these costs could not be placed on defendant.
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
26. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974). Mr. Justice Powell stated- "A
critical fact in this litigation is that petitioner's individual stake in the damage award he seeks is
only $70. No competent attorney would undertake this complex antitrust action to recover so
inconsequential an amount. Economic reality dictates that petitioner's suit proceed as a class
action or not at all." Id. The threshold issue on appeal was the district court's placing notice costs
on the defendant, which the Court found to be clearly a Cohen collateral order. Id. at 171-72.
27. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1305 (2d Cir. 1971); text accompanying
note 7 supra.
28. 443 F.2d at 1307. The court used $10,000 as a guideline since it is the federal
jurisdictional minimum for certain types of cases, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) (diversity) which
"suggestls] that it is sufficient incentive to keep a case alive." In Kom, appeal was allowed because
plaintiffs daim was $386 (and the claims of the eight intervenors totalled $1930), but in the
companion case, Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), appeal was
dismissed since plaintiff's claim, combined with that of her husband, amounted to $8500.
Id. at 1306.
29. The Second Circuit allowed appeal of the denial of class action certification in the
following cases: Lerman v. Tenney, 459 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (information as to
amount of plaintiffs claim unreported); Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971)
(plaintiffs claim amounted to $386); Green v. Volf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969) (plaintiffs claim amounted to less than $1000); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (plaintiffs claim
amounted to $70).
Appeal was denied by the Second Circuit in the following cases: Shayne v. Madison Square
Garden Corp., 491 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1974) (plaintiffs claim amounted to $7,482); Milberg v.
Western Pac. R.R., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (plaintiffs claim amounted to $8500); Caceres v.
International Air Transp. Ass'n, 422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970) (claims of the seven plaintiffs
averaged $150,000); City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d
Cir. 1969) (plaintiff and twenty-seven intervenors had "substantial amounts" at stake). The court
also drew attention to the fact that authorities on rule 23 have recommended the use of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1970) (see note 114 and accompanying text infra), an indication that it was not
believed that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 would be available, and that rule 23(c)(1) provides for alteration,
amendation or modification of the class action determination at any time before a decision on the
merits, an indication that immediate appeal was not contemplated. Caceres v. International Air
Transp. Ass'n, 422 F.2d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 1970).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

was criticized on several grounds: that it obliged the courts to make ad hoc

judgments, thus making it unworkable; 30 that it created the "spectacle" of a
plaintiff minimizing his damages in order to obtain jurisdiction; 3' and that

while denial of certification would not be the "death knell" of the action for
potential class members with
the plaintiff, it might be the "death knell" for 32
insufficient resources to litigate on their own.
The "death knell" doctrine has been accepted in several circuits, 33 and

modified in others by the addition of other criteria to the Second Circuit's
financial guidelines. Thus, in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the extent of his financial resources, anticipated costs of
litigation, and the potential amounts of claims of other class members before

whether or not the class action denial is
the court of appeals will determine
34
the "death knell" of the action.

30. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., concurring).
31. Shayne v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 491 F.2d 397, 401 n.11 (2d Cir. 1974).
32. City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 300-01 (2d Cir.
1969) (Hays, J., dissenting). This argument was rejected in Caceres v. International Air Transp.
Ass'n, 422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970) on the ground that if it were followed, all class action denials
would be appealable. Such a result would be contrary to the policy underlying the final judgment
rule. Id. at 143; cf. Weingartner v. Union Oil Co., 431 F.2d 26, 30 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1000 (1971).
33. E.g., Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (appeal dismissed since plaintiffs had sufficient incentive to
continue the suit); Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215, 1223 (8th Cir. 1973) (appeal dismissed since
"an order refusing to permit an action to be maintained as a class action which does not operate as the
death knell of the action is not appealable. . .."); Falk v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 472 F.2d 142,
143-44 (9th Cir. 1972) (appeal dismissed; plaintiff's claim amounted to $14,125); Weingartner v.
Union Oil Co., 431 F.2d 26, 29 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000(1971) (appeal dismissed;
claims of fifteen plaintiffs totalled $353,700).
34. E.g., Graci v. United States, 472 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928
(1973) (appeal dismissed; plaintiffs claim amounted to $78,700 and no evidence as to the
additional criteria was offered); Gosa v. Securities Inv. Co., 449 F.2d 1330, 1332 (5th Cir.
1971) (appeal dismissed; plaintiffs claim amounted to $3,322.20, but he had offered no evidence
as to the additional criteria); see Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 F.2d 1143, 1149 (6th
Cir. 1975) (appeal allowed; plaintiff's claim amounted to $30; "[t]he district court may dispense
with th[e] requirement [of proving the additional criteria] where it takes judicial notice that the
amount involved is so small that it is obviously unfeasible for an individual plaintiff to continue
the litigation without class action status." Accord, Graci v. United States, 472 F.2d 124, 126 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973)); cf. Cotten v. Treasure Lake Inc., 518 F.2d 770, 772 (6th
Cir. 1975) (appeal dismissed, plaintiffs had sufficient motivation to continue on their own so
consideration of the "death knell" was not reached); Greenhouse v. Greco, 496 F.2d 213 (5th Cir.
1974) (per curiam) (appeal dismissed; class action denial was not the "death knell" of the action);
Siebert v. Great N. Dev. Co., 494 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (same); Songy v.
Coastal Chem. Corp., 469 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (same); Lamarche v. Sunbeam
Television Corp., 446 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). But cf. Miller v. Mackey Intl., Inc.,
452 F.2d 424, 427 n.3 (5th Cir. 1971) (appeal allowed based on the "death knell" doctrine or
the collateral order doctrine).
The Second Circuit has also indicated that it would consider the complexity of the issues in
determining whether or not an individual plaintiff could continue on his own. Korn v. Franchard
Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971).
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The Third and Seventh Circuits have rejected the doctrine.3 The Third
Circuit did so in Hackett v. General Host Corp.,36 wherein the plaintiff, with
an individual claim of $9, sought to represent 1,500,000 members of an
asserted class, alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.3" The appeal
of the denial of class action certification was dismissed with the court basing
its decision on the availability of alternative methods of appeal, 38 the policy
against interlocutory appellate review 39 and the belief that the provision for
attorney's fees for the successful plaintiff in the Sherman Act action40 would
prevent the denial of class certification from sounding the death knell of the
action. 4 1 This rationale, however, does not withstand close scrutiny. The
alternative methods of appeal are less satisfactory than the "death knell"
doctrine since they are not appeals as of right as are appeals from final
decisions, 42 but depend on the discretion of one or more courts 43 or are
available only in a limited area. 4 In addition, courts as well as commentators
have expressed great skepticism about the assertion that the availability of
attorney's fees would provide sufficient incentive for the suit to continue given
the enormous costs involved in litigating antitrust and securities cases and the
limited size of the attorney's fees recoverable. 45 Since it seems highly doubtful
that the plaintiffs in Hackett or Eisen would continue on their own, the
35. King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); see
Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 1974) (appeal of district court's
decertification with respect to damages claims dismissed); Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455
F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
36. 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970).
38. 455 F.2d at 623-24. The alternative remedies suggested were appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1970), discussed in pt. MIinfra; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), discussed in pt. VI infra; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (1970), discussedin pt. Vinfra, and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970), discussed in pt. IV infra.
39. 455 F.2d at 623.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1971).
41. 455 F.2d 622-23. "If the 'death knell' is to ring for her case the rope is in her attorney's
hand." Id.at 623.
42. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
43. See 455 F.2d at 631 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), discussed in pt.
III infra, requires certification by the district court and acceptance by the court of appeals. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b), discussed in pt. VI infra, also requires district court certification. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (1970) (mandamus), discussed in pL V infra, is discretionary with the court of appeals.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970), discussed in pt. IV infra, applies only where the denial of
the class action certification also effectively narrows the scope of a requested injunction.
45. E.g., Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 F.2d 1143, 1149 (6th Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs
in antitrust actions also incur substantial costs, which would not be recoverable); Hackett v.
General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 631 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, J.,dissenting), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
925 (1972); 86 Harv. L. Rev. 438, 440-42 (1972) (amounts recovered by plaintiffs for attorney's
fees in antitrust actions rarely exceed the amount of the damages awarded); 17 Widl. L. Rev. 962,
971-72 (1972) (statutes not providing for recovery of attorney's fees heavily outnumber those
which do). But see Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363, 367-68 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) ("It certainly may be questioned whether the 'Death Knell'
doctrine can ever be applied to a case where attorney's fees are available to the prevailing
party."); see text accompanying note 20 supra.
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litigation effectively is terminated and this is no longer the interlocutory
appeal objected to by the court, but, rather a final decision. 4 6 The Hackett
court, however, did not limit itself to jurisdictional arguments. Refusing to
make class actions more attractive to attorneys by making the denial appealable, it expressed hostility toward class actions brought by small claimants
on behalf of huge classes, particularly in cases where public enforcement
remedies are available, stating:
If in some cases... the individual claim often will be so small that neither private nor
public lawyers think it should be litigated, then that decision of the legal marketplace
may be the best reflection of a public consciousness
that the time of the lawyers and of
47
the court should best be spent elsewhere.

It should, however, be noted that public enforcement remedies have proven
inadequate in the past. 48 While the claims of litigants may appear insig49
nificant, they may have substantial importance to the individual involved.
Indeed, Professor Kaplan, reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules, has described the "historic mission" of class actions as "taking care of
the little guy"' s and as providing a "means of vindicating the rights of groups
of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their
opponents into court at all." 5' In addition, Congress, by not requiring a
minimum jurisdictional amount in antitrust and securities actions, clearly has
invited small claimants and the Supreme Court has indicated approval of
5 2
such class actions.
46.
47.

See text accompanying note 21 supra.
455 F.2d at 626. But see Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) where, upon the denial of a rehearing en banc,
Judge Robinson, speaking for himself and three others, urged the court to permit appeal of the
denial of the class action certification. He found that nonappealability would "chill" class action
litigation which he characterized as "the refuge of the poor, the hope of the downtrodden." Id. at
371.
48. See Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299,
304-05 (1973).

49. See 455 F.2d at 632 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
50. Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 A.B.A. Antitrust L.J. 295,
299 (1966), reporting conversation with Professor Kaplan.
51. Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 497 (1969). One commentator
has stated that "[i]t would be anomalous if an antitrust violator who happened to injure numerous
consumers each in a small degree rather than a few customers in a large degree were permitted to
avoid liability for that injury." 86 Harv. L. Rev. 438, 446-47 (1972). But see 3B J. Moore,
Federal Practice
23.02-fl], at 124 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Moore] where Professor
Moore questions "whether the federal courts should become collection agencies."
52. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against those who
command the status quo." (footnote omitted)); American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.
538 (1974) (holding that the statute of limitations is tolled for absent class members by the
institution of the class action); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) (endorsing
the using of class actions in the antitrust area). Congress recently amended the Truth In Lending
Act, making it clear that the class action was available under that statute. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640
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Thus, it seems clear that the death knell doctrine which permits appeal of a
denial of a class action certification which, for all practical purposes, terminates the litigation is the more valid approach than the questionable
reasoning of the Hackett majority.
A strict interpretation of the collateral order doctrine, however, does lead to
the conclusion that absent the "death knell" situation, an order denying class
action certification is not a final decision within the purview of that doctrine.
The collateral order doctrine, as established in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.5 3 requires that the order appealed from be separable from and
collateral to the merits and that delayed review of the order may result in the
right being irreparably lost.5 4 The Supreme Court has stated that an issue is a
separate matter when it is "not enmeshed in the factual and legal issues
comprising the plaintiffs cause of action." 55 However, review of a denial of
class action certification often involves consideration of the merits, especially
when the district court has held that common questions of law and fact did
not predominate, 5 6 or that the representative plaintiffs claims were not
typical of the claims and defenses of the class. 5 7 In addition, review of the
(Supp. 1, 1975) discussed in Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1975). But
see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (holding that plaintiff must bear the cost of
notifying the class); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (holding that every
class member must satisfy the jurisdictional amount for suits in federal courts in diversity cases);
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (holding that claims of class members may not be
aggregated to satisfy the federal jurisdictional amount). Congress is considering remedial legislation which would permit consumers to sue as a class in federal court in diversity cases. Staff of
the S. Commerce Comm., Class Action Study, BNA Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. No. 670, at
G-1 (July 2, 1974) [hereinafter referred to as Senate Study].
53. 337 U.S. 541 (1949); see text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
54. 337 U.S. at 546-47.
55. Mercantile Natl Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963).
56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires in relevant part that "the court [find] that the questions
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members.... ." See, e.g., Caceres v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 46 F.R.D. 89, 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970) (in order to
decide whether common questions of fact predominated, the court of appeals would have had to
review a substantive issue in the case); cf. Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094, 1100
(2d Cir. 1974) (review of a class action certification where defendants alleged no common
questions of law or fact, in an employment discrimination case, would have involved consideration of discriminatory pattern and practice in hiring, an issue at the "heart" of the merits). But see
Note, Interlocutory Appeal From Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 Colum. L. Rev.
1292, 1303 (1970) (the argument made in this Note for broad appealability of a class action
designation was rejected by the Second Circuit in Kom v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1305
(2d Cir. 1971)).
57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) requires, in relevant part, that "the claims or defenses of the
representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class." See, e.g., Williams v.
Mumford, 511 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. OcL 7, 1975)
(plaintiffs alleged employment discrimination; review of the district court determination that the
representatives' claims were not typical would clearly have involved review of the factual issues).
Although the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974)
prohibited a preliminary hearing on the merits to determine whether plaintiff had substantial
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class action denial is available
after final judgment on the merits; thus no
"right" is irreparably lost.5 8 Perhaps the most important argument against
permitting appeal of class action denials, absent the death knell situation, is
found in the following language in Cohen:
If the right were admitted or clear and the order involved only an exercise of discretion
as to the amount of security, a matter the statute makes subject to reconsideration
different question. 59

from time to time, appealability would present a

Since most class action determinations involve findings which are discretionary with the trial judge, 60 and since rule 23 makes them subject to
reconsideration, 6' the denial of class certification clearly does not fit within
the Cohen guidelines.
The appealability of an order denying class action certification may more
arguably fit into the Gillespie62 requirements since Gillespie involved appeal
of an order going to the merits of the case. 63 It also required that the order be
"fundamental to the further conduct" of the case and mandated the balancing
of "the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review .. .and the danger of
denying justice by delay on the other." 64 The fundamentality requirement has
probability of succeeding on the merits, the district courts clearly must consider the merits to
determine whether or not the requirements of rule 23 are met. These two procedural situations
are clearly distinguishable.
There are, however, instances where the court of appeals would not be required to become
involved in the merits on review of the class action denial. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (district court's order placed notice costs on defendants); Miller v.
Mackey Intl Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971) (district court's denial of the class action on the
ground that plaintiff did not make a preliminary showing of substantial possibility of success
reversed; this was not a proper factor for the court to consider in deciding on a rule 23 motion);
Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971) (district
court disapproval of a proposed settlement of a class action is appealable since the proposed
settlement is independent of the merits of the case).
58. The representation of a class has been termed a "right" by some commentators. See, e.g.,
17 Vill. L. Rev. 962, 977 (1972). Several courts have held that the fact that the denial is
reviewable on appeal makes the collateral order doctrine inapplicable. See, e.g., Williams v.
Mumford, 511 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 7,
1975); City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 299-300 (2d Cir.
1969); cf. Falk v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 472 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of
whether or not, as a practical matter, review is likely on appeal, see pt. VIII infra.
59. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949).
60. City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir.
1969); 3B Moore, supra note 51,
23.50, at 23-1105.
61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(cXl) provides: "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits."
62. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); see text accompanying notes
14-18 supra.
63. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L.
Rev. 89, 118 (1975).
64. 379 U.S. at 152-53.
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been interpreted to mean that, if the order appealed from were reversed, the
case could not continue. 65 Another interpretation has been that the issue
involved be significant to the legal world in general. 66 It is obvious that an
appeal of a class action denial does not fit into the first interpretation and, in
most cases, the issues on appeal of a class action denial involve factual
situations peculiar to that case, rather than legal issues of general significance. 67 In addition, the court in Gillespie sought to avoid the danger of
denying justice by protecting the rights of individuals whose claims for
recovery would have been effectively cut off until appeal of the final judgment 68 However, potential class members have the alternative of instituting
their own actions if class standing is denied or they may attempt to intervene
in the pending action under rule 24.
Thus, a denial of class certifiation should be appealable where the death
knell requirements are satisfied. In other cases, the Cohen and Gillespie
exceptions are not broad enough to support such appeals.
The Second Circuit did not confront the issue of the appealability of a class
certification by a defendant until 1972 in Herbst v. International Telephone
and Telegraph Corp.69 Although two other circuits previously had held such
orders nonappealable, 70 the court in Herbst permitted the appeal. Plaintiff
was the owner of one hundred shares of Hartford Fire Insurance Co. stock at
the time of its merger with ITT. She alleged that the merger of Hartford and
ITT involved violations of the Securities Acts and she sought damages on
behalf of herself and over 16,000 class members. The district court certified
the class and defendant appealed. The court of appeals relied on the "practical rather than technical construction" rationale of Cohen and the "fundamental to the further conduct of the case" rationale of Gillespie to permit the
65. Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094, 1098 (2d Cir. 1974). But see General
Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 657 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring) ("[The term 'fundamental to the further conduct of the case' was not intended to
mean that unless review were granted the action would no longer be viable.").
66. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L.
Rev. 89, 120 (1975).
67. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 56-57 supra.
68. 379 U.S. at 153.
69. 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974). The court did, however, formulate what is now known as the
tripartite test for determining the appealability of a class action certification in Eisen I, 479 F.2d
1005, 1007 n.1 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974): "The 'collateral order' doctrine of
Cohen is based on the pragmatic view that a decision which finally determines an issue in the case
which is crucial to the further conduct of the case, and is collateral to the merits of the action, is
to receive immediate appellate review if delay in such review will cause 'irreparable harm' to the
complaining party." However, the appeal was allowed, not on this basis, but because the court
had retained jurisdiction when it remanded the case to the district court after Eisen 11, 391 F.2d
555 (2d Cir. 1968).
70. Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 469 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1972); Walsh v. City of
Detroit, 412 F.2d 226 (6th. Cir. 1969). In Walsh, the court did not find that the order was
collateral, nor did it consider it final since rule 23(cX1) provides that an order determining
whether or not a class action is maintainable "may be conditional, and may be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits." Id. at 227.
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appeal. 7 1 However, it placed greatest emphasis on judicial efficiency and the
harm to the litigants which would result from deferral of appeal. It noted that
defendants were likely to spend more money and time in defense if the class
were certified because of the enormous damages sought, that both parties
would have to expend much time and effort to notify class members, that
class actions were much more demanding of a district court's time than a suit
brought by a single individual by reason of the supervisory requirements
imposed by rule 23 and 72the fact that defendants were more likely to settle
once a class is certified.
Although the Herbst court advocated broad appealability of orders granting
class certification, 73 it appears to be the only case permitting such an appeal.
Subsequent to Herbst, the Second Circuit raised new barriers to such
appeals and other circuits have followed suit. In Kohn v. Royall, Koegel &
Wells 74 and in General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 7 5 decided within
two months of Herbst, the Second Circuit clarified the test first announced in
Eisen 111,76 outlining its requirements as follows:
(1) Whether
the class action determination is "fundamental to the further conduct
77
of the case";
(2) whether review of that order is "separable from the merits;"
(3) whether that order will cause "irreparable harm to a defendant in terms of time
"78
and money spent in defending a huge class action ....
Neither defendant satisfied any of the test's requirements7 9 and the appeals
71. 495 F.2d at 1312; see text accompanying notes 11-18 supra.
72. 495 F.2d at 1312-13. For a discussion of the validity of the court's reliance on these
factors, see pt. VIII infra.
73. 495 F.2d at 1312. "We believe that immediate review of orders authorizing class actions
will aid the district courts in disposing of these cases and promote the sound administration of
justice." Id.
74. 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
75. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
76. See note 69 supra. The tripartite test had its origins in Cohen and Gillespie. See text
accompanying notes 11-18 supra.

77. The court called the class certification order "further to the fundamental conduct of the
case" because, if it were reversed on appeal, the action would be at an end for all practical
purposes where the plaintiff was an Eisen type small claimant. The court recognized however
that other interlocutory orders which, if reversed on appeal, would terminate the litigation, are
not appealable, e.g., orders denying motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) or for
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 496 F.2d at 1098-99.

78.

496 F.2d at 1098; see 501 F.2d at 644. The Tenth Circuit adopted the test in Seiffer v.

Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 520 F.2d 795, 797-98 (10th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.

3249 (U.S. Oct. 28, 1975) (No. 75-574). The Ninth Circuit rejected the test in Blackie v. Barrack,
No. 74-2141, at 6-7 (9th Cir., Sept. 25, 1975).
79. In General Motors, plaintiff's claim amounted to $12,000,000 so reversal of the certification would not be the "death knell" of the action. The defendant contended that common
questions of law and fact did not predominate; inquiry into this criteria would have involved
consideration of the merits; defendant would not incur irreparable harm in defending the action
against the class since the class consisted of 177 entities as compared with the 16,000 in Herbst.
501 F.2d at 644-47.
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were dismissed. In addition, in General Motors, the court noted that, unlike
the order involved in Cohen, an order certifying a class was reviewable by the
trial court until a final decision on the merits,8 0 a factor not considered in
Herbst. It also noted that defendant's attack on the certification was grounded
on the contention that two requirements of rule 23(b)(3) were not met: (I) that
common questions of law and fact must predominate and (2) that the class
action be superior to other available methods of adjudication:
Accordingly, we would review here not a finite and conclusive determination of
judicial power-e.g. the power to shift notice costs and forego individualized notice, as
in Eisen, or the power to dispense with security, as in Cohen-but a discretionary
decision, the propriety of which will necessarily vary from case to case. That this
distinction is of fundamental importance in the calculus of appealability was plainly
acknowledged in Cohen itself.8'
Since Herbst involved a consideration of rule 23(b)(3) requirements, de82
termination of which was clearly within the district court's discretion,
General Motors is a definite retreat from Herbst and appears to establish a
new criterion for permitting appeal of a class action certification: that the
review must not involve a discretionary decision of the district court. The
retreat was confirmed by the Second Circuit in Parkinsonv. April Industries,
Inc.,8 3 where the court held that the appeal would be dismissed when the
defendant questioned a discretionary rule 23 ruling of the trial judge.8 4 Thus,
while the Parkinson court reaffirmed the tripartite test,8 5 it added another
restriction: that discretionary rulings are not appealable.
The tripartite test is not immune to criticism. The first requirement-that
the order be "fundamental to the further conduct of the case"-has been
interpreted to mean "whether the action's viability turns on the class action
Kohn involved a sex discrimination complaint under rule 23(b)(2). The court found that
plaintiff would continue on her own if the certification were reversed since in this area, attorneys
from the "public interest" bar were available to aid plaintiffs. Again, defendant contended that
common questions of law and fact did not predominate, inquiry into which would involve
consideration of the merits of the action. The court also found that the defendant would incur no
additional costs in defending against a class as compared to an individual since the scope of
relevant inquiry would be the same in either situation. 496 F.2d at 1099-1100.
80. 501 F.2d at 646-47; see text accompanying note S4 supra.
81. 501 F.2d at 647.
82. The Herbst court reviewed the rule 23(a)(2) requirement that plaintiffs claims be typical
of the class and the rule 23(b)(3) requirement that common questions of law or fact predominate.
495 F.2d at 1313-16.
83. 520 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1975).
84. Id. at 658. The court recognized that "[t]he continuing precedential validity of Herbst
...is an open question which is not now before us." Id. n.9. It did however leave the door open
to appeal in cases where manageability would "present questions so important that an immediate
appeal... will lie." Id. But see Handwerger v. Ginsberg, 519 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1975) where, in
dismissing an appeal of an order certifying a class, the court found that defendant did not meet
the tripartite test and did not discuss the fact that discretionary rulings of the district court were
at issue on appeal.
85. 520 F.2d at 656.
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determination. '8 6 The Second Circuit itself has recognized that this is not
consistent with refusals to allow appeal from motions denying summary
judgment where, if the denial were reversed, the litigation would also
terminate. 87 The second requirement, that the order be separable from the
merits, has proven difficult for a defendant to meet. 88 The third requirement,
that of "irreparable harm to a defendant" is contrary to the principle that
"there is no substantive right to protection from unnecessary litigation."8 9 The
Parkinson court disagreed with the Herbst court's contention that appeal of a
class action certification serves to alleviate burdens on district court judges
and is justified as an exercise of the appellate court's supervisory powers. 90 It
found that the burdens thrust upon a trial court by unnecessary litigation
were not of sufficient concern when weighed against the policy against
"noxious interference" by the appellate courts into the "proper sphere of the
trial judge." 9 1
Thus, it is doubtful that orders certifying class actions are appealable under
any circumstances. The Cohen requirement of separability from the merits is
difficult to meet; discretionary orders prohibited by Cohen are often involved;
and review of the order is available after final judgment. 92 Gillespie is clearly
86. 496 F.2d at 1099.
87. Id. at 1098-99; see note 77 supra.
88. E.g., Handwerger v. Ginsberg, 519 F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1975) (defendant contended
that plaintiff could not adequately represent the class as required by rule 23(a)(4) since plaintiff
had allegedly received an accurate description of one of several financial transactions, plaintiff
claimed defendant had fraudulently represented. Defendant contended that this was the only
transaction on which a claim could be made. The court held that to decide on these contentions
would involve an inquiry into the merits.); Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 520 F.2d 795, 798 (10th
Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 28, 1975) (No. 75-574) (defendant
contended that common questions of law and fact did not predominate as required by rule
23(b)(3) since each individual class member should have to prove due diligence. The court held
that such an inquiry on its part would involve it with an "integral part of the cause of action.");
In re Cessna Aircraft Distributorship Antitrust Litig., 518 F.2d 213, 216 (8th Cir. 1975), petition
for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975) (No. 75-435) (defendant contended that the
class representative would not adequately represent the class' interests as required by rule 23(a)(4)
since, inter alia, its status as a former dealer created a conflict of interest with present dealers.
The court held that consideration of that issue would plunge it "headlong" into the merits of the
case.). For a discussion of this issue in relation to General Motors and Kohn, see note 79 supra.
But see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 (1974) (the district court's placing the
cost of notice on defendant was collateral to the merits); see, Note, Class Action Certification
Orders: An Argument for the Defendant's Right to Appeal, 42 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 621, 628
(1974).
89. Comment, Collateral Orders and Extraordinary Writs as Exceptions to the Finality Rule,
51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 746, 750 (1957). But see Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555
(1963) where appeal of a question was allowed where the matter was "not enmeshed in tile
factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action" and where long and complex
litigation could be avoided were appeal allowed. Id. at 558.
90. Herbst v. ITT, 495 F.2d 1308, 1313 (2d Cir. 1974).
91. 520 F.2d at 654.
92. In re Cessna Aircraft Distributorship Antitrust Litig., 518 F.2d 213, 216 (8th Cir. 1975),
petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975) (No. 75-435). See pt. VIII Infra, for
a discussion of whether, as a practical matter, the order will be appealed.

1975]

CLASS ACTION DETERMINATIONS

inapplicable since no parties are denied justice by delayed review. 93 Perhaps,
however, the most compelling argument against permitting immediate appeal
is the specific provision in rule 23(c)(2) for review by the district court of its
certification order. Permitting an appeal each time a district court issues a
new certification order could indeed lead to successive appeals on the same
94
issue, a result clearly at odds with the purposes of the final judgment rule.
Thus, the requirements of the final judgment rule as interpreted by the
courts can only be satisfied when a plaintiff with a small claim wishes to
appeal an order denying certification.

III.

APPEAL UNDER SECTION 1292(b)

In 1958, Congress passed The Interlocutory Appeals Act 95 which grants
discretion to the courts of appeal to review interlocutory orders which (1) the
district court has certified as involving a controlling question of law, (2)
resolution of which will materially advance the litigation, (3) as to which there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion. All three criteria must be met
before the district court may grant the section 1292(b) certificate, 96 but
discretion to grant leave97to appeal at the level of the court of appeals is not
limited by any criteria.
It has been suggested by some commentators that, since one of the criteria
to be met is that the order must involve "a controlling question of law," its use
is inappropriate where matters involved are within the discretion of the
district court. 98 Since class action determinations are largely discretionary
with the district court, 99 such an interpretation of section 1292(b) would
93. In Gillespie the court's concern was that decedent's brother and sisters might have to
wait years before their claims could be adjudicated. 379 U.S. at 153; see text accompanying note
17 supra. But cf. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912
(1971) where the court permitted appeal of a district court order disapproving a settlement of a
class action. The court found that the district court's order was collateral to the merits, and that
the "right of the unnamed plaintiffs to fair representation" could be infringed by erroneous
disapproval of the settlement. It also found that the specter of a lengthy and expensive trial
outweighed the cost and delay of piecemeal review. Id. at 774. Although a fair amount of
emphasis was placed by the court on the avoidance of a costly trial, it was careful to point out
that other Cohen and Gillespie requirements were met.
94. See text accompanying note 7 supra. This has clearly been an important factor in the
court's rejection of these appeals. See, e.g., In re Cessna Aircraft Distributorship Antitrust Litig.,
518 F.2d 213, 215-16 (8th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Nov. 4,
1975) (No. 75-435); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 646-47 (2d Cir.
1974); Walsh v. City of Detroit, 412 F.2d 226, 227 (6th Cir. 1969).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
96. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 754 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 885 (1974); Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75
Colum. L. Rev. 89, 109 (1975).
97. Hearings on H.RI 6238 & H.R. 7260 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11, at 21 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
98. 9 Moore, supra note 51, 110.22[2], at 261; C. Wright, Federal Courts § 102, at 463 (2d
ed. 1970). But see Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
88 Harv. L. Rev. 607, 618 n.57 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note].
99. "[W]here the trial court does apply the Rule's criteria to the facts of the case, the trial
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severely limit review of district courts' determinations of class actions under
that section. At the very least, section 1292(b) should apply when the issue is
whether or not the district court applied the correct factors as required by rule
23.100

However, the Third Circuit, in permitting a section 1292(b) appeal of a
class action certification in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,101 reviewed a
discretionary finding of the district court. 10 2 It glossed over the requirement of
"controlling question of law" but rather looked to the policies favoring
10 4
interlocutory appeals10 3 and to the legislative history of section 1292(b).
According to the court, the House of Representatives, in considering the types
of orders appropriate for interlocutory review emphasized judicial efficiency
and avoidance of hardship to litigants' 05 with the stated purpose of the bill
being "to expedite the ultimate termination of litigation and thereby save
unnecessary expense and delay."' 0 6 Thus, for the Katz court, the first
requirement is almost equivalent to the second, that resolution of the question
certified "materially advance termination of the litigation." Although a line of
cases holds that section 1292(b) was only to be applied in "exceptional" cases
07
where immediate appeal might avoid "protracted and expensive litigation,"',
a net reduction in trial time and cost to litigants would seem to be all that is
necessary to meet this requirement. 08 The requirement would be easily
satisfied where defendant is attempting to obtain the section 1292(b) certificate
court has a broad discretion in determining whether the action may be maintained as a class
action. . . ." 3B Moore, supra note 51,
23.50, at 23-1105; see, e.g., City of New York v.
International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1969).
100. Harvard Note, supra note 98, at 618 n.57.
101. 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
102. The court reviewed the question of whether the class action was superior to alternative
methods of handling the controversy. Id. at 757.
103. The court stated. "The key consideration is not whether the order involves the exercise
of discretion, but whether it truly implicates the policies favoring interlocutory appeal. . . the
avoidance of harm to a party pendente lite from a possibly erroneous interlocutory order and the
avoidance of possibly wasted trial time and litigation expense." Id. at 756. Accord, Tucker v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 95,107, at 97,938
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
104. 496 F.2d at 753-54.
105. The examples discussed were cases where (1) there is an adjudication of liability which
will necessitate an extended accounting for damages, (2) "a long trial would be necessary for the
determination of liability or damages upon a decision overruling a defense going to the right to
maintain the action," (3) third-party defendants are involved, "where there would be no reason
for going on if they could not be held liable," (4) the case involves a transfer "when it is claimed
that the transfer is not authorized by law." Hearings, supra note 97, at 8-9.
106. H.R. Rep. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958) [hereinafter cited as House Report].
107. Milbert v. Bison Laboratories, Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 1958). But see
Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697, 703 & n.13 (5th Cir. 1961) (exceptional case
doctrine is a "shibboleth').
108. While the House Report includes the exceptional case requirement, the Senate Report
does not. Compare House Report, supra note 106, at 2 with S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-4 (1958); see Harvard Note, supra note 98, at 627.
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since class action litigation is often more protracted and expensive than
actions brought by a single plaintiff.10 9 Thus a reversal of the order certifying
the class would lessen the burden on the courts and litigants. I 1 It is less dear
that an order denying class certification would be appropriate for a section
1292(b) certificate. However, refusal to certify a class could lead to a multiplicity of class suits, a burden on the courts which could be avoided by a
section 1292(b) review and a possible reversal of the refusal to certify."'
The third requirement, that there be substantial grounds for difference of
opinion, requires the trial judge to determine whether arguments against his
order have merit" 12 and whether he believes the court of appeals might
13
reverse his order.'
Whatever doubts exist about the appropriateness of a section 1292(b)
certification in a class action, the weight of authority favors its use. The
drafters of rule 23 strongly advocated the use of section 1292(b) to review rule
23 orders, stating, "We should be disturbed, however, if the change in the
form of the Rule caused the Courts to determine that there was no 'controlling
question of law,' but only questions of 'discretion' not subject to review under
Subdivision (b) of Section 1292 of Title 28."1"4 The Third Circuit, which does
not permit appeal as of right from class action determinations under either the
death knell or collateral order doctrines" s has come out strongly in favor
of using section 1292(b) to grant both plaintiffs" 6 and defendants"17 the right
to appeal. The Second Circuit, which originated the death knell doctrine,'"
has hinted that section 1292(b) might be the only appropriate route for an
appeal by a defendant" 9 and has also suggested its use by a plaintiff in a
120
non-death knell situation.
109.

Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975); American College of

Trial Lawyers, Report and Recommendations of the Special Comm. on Rule 23 of the Fed. R.
Civ. P., 15-17 (1972). But see Senate Study, supra note 52, at G-1.
110.

Tuckerv. Arthur Andersen & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.

95,107, at 97,938 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

111. Cf. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 434 (D. VL 1971), aft'd, 469 F.2d
1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
112. Comment, Discretionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders: A Guided Tour
Through Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69 Yale L.J. 333, 342 (1959).
113. See Harvard Note, supra note 98, at 624.
114. Report of the A.B.A. Special Comm. on Federal Rules of Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 95, 104
(1965); cf. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 390 n.131 (1967) (Professor Kaplan was
Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from 1960 to 1966).
115. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
116. Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1974); Hackett v.
General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 623 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).

117. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 752-56 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 885 (1974); accord, In re Cessna Aircraft Distributorship Antitrust Litig., 518 F.2d 213,
216 (8th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975) (No. 75-435).
118. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
119. Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 655 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975).
120. Caceres v. International Air Transp. Ass'n., 422 F.2d 141, 144 (2d Cir., 1970).
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It is often difficult to determine why district courts refuse to certify a
question under section 1292(b) since they are not required to give reasons for
the decisions, and often do not.' 2 1 However, two district courts in the Second
Circuit have indicated that their refusals to certify their denials of a class
action determination would be contrary to the law in the Second Circuit
which permits interlocutory appeal of a class action denial in a death knell
situation only. 1 22 This approach does not take into account whether the
requirements of section 1292(b) were satisfied and ignores the fact that the
section is a statutory exception to the final judgment rule thus not requiring a
death knell situation. A more valid reason for refusal of section 1292(b)
certificate to review denial of class action certification would be the fact that
the case was about to go to trial23and the appeal would "materially delay final
'
termination of the litigation.'
Section 1292(b) certificates have been granted, however, to review discretionary district court class determinations where an issue was raised
respecting conflicts of interest between the class representative and class
members; 24 where common questions of law and fact predominated; 25 and
where it was unclear whether the class action was superior to other available
methods of adjudication. 126 A section 1292(b) certificate has also been granted
to review such questions of law as whether a diversity case may be allowed to
121. See, e.g., Albertson's, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 62 F.R.D. 43, 58 (D. Utah
1973), affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1974); La Mar
v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22, 26 (D. Ore. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 489
F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973).
122. Wood v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 669, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Hyatt v. United
Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242, 248 (D. Conn. 1970). But see Kinzler v. New York Stock Exch.,
62 F.R.D. 196, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("I think the District Court should be encouraged ... to
certify an appeal . . . under § 1292(b).').
123. Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1070 (N.D. III. 1972).
124. See, e.g., Albertson's, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 62 F.R.D. 43 (D. Utah 1973),
affd in part and vacated in part, 503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1974). The appellate court vacated the
district court's denial of certification on one of the counts in plaintiff's complaint since the trial
court had made no findings, indicating, however, that once the findings were made it would not
consider another interlocutory appeal since that count was not the "core" of the case. 503 F.2d at
464. The appellate court agreed with the district court in its class action rulings on the other
counts. Id.
125. Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
963 (1975) (the court of appeals reversed the district court's certification of the class); In re Hotel
Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 88-92 (9th Cir. 1974) (the court of appeals reversed the district court's
certification of the class); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
95,107, at 97,937 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kinzler v. New York Stock Exch., 62
F.R.D. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
126. Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 210-12 (9th Cir. 1974) (district court's
refusal to certify the class affirmed since there was no abuse of discretion); Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp., 496 F.2d 747,760 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (district court's
certification of the class reversed since the test case method was held superior to the class action);
Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d 336, 345 (10th Cir. 1973) (district court's refusal to certify
the class affirmed since the order was within its sound discretion).
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proceed as a class action when the named plaintiffs meet the jurisdictional
requirement, but the class members do not 27 and whether named plaintiffs
could represent a class against defendants with whom the named plaintiffs
themselves had no dealings.' 28 A certificate was also granted when the court
of appeals, on review, found that the district court did not consider the
correct factors in making the class action determination.' 2 9
Since section 1292(b) may often be the only method by which the parties are
able to obtain review of a class action determination, 30 it should be utilized
in those cases where novel or controversial questions are at issue, in order to
expedite termination of the litigation and to give the district courts guidance
in disposing of rule 23 motions for class action certification.
IV. APPEAL UNDER SECTION 1292(a)(1)
Another avenue for appeal of the denial of class action certification is
section 1292(a)(1) which provides:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction from

. . .

interlocutory orders of the

district courts of the United States ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
131
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions. . ..
Several circuits have allowed appeal as of right to class action plaintiffs under
this section when the denial of class certification has had the effect of
narrowing the scope of injunctive relief requested by the plaintiff. In Price v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 132 a recent Ninth Circuit decision, plaintiff brought an
employment discrimination complaint against his employer and labor union
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 133 The court of appeals permitted a
section 1292(a)(1) appeal of the class action denial, reasoning that the injunctive
relief obtainable by plaintiff on his own would probably benefit him alone
while the discriminatory practices affecting all employees would be left
unremedied. This rationale has been used by the First, 134 Fourth and Fifth
127. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 434 (D. Vt. 1971), afld, 469 F.2d 1033
(2d Cir. 1972), affd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
128. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22, 24-25 (D. Ore. 1972), rev'd, 489
F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973).
129. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'g 47
F.R.D. 327 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (the district court found that plaintiff was not a proper representative of the class unless he could prove his own right to relief; the court of appeals held that this
was not the proper standard to apply and was an abuse of discretion).
130. Appeal as of right is only available in a death knell situation and, even then, is not
available in the Third and Seventh Circuits. See pt. II supra. Mandamus is available only in
exceptional cases. See pt. V infra. Section 1292(aXI) is available only in limited circumstances.
See pt. IV infra. The other methods of appeal are only available to plaintiff and are of limited
use. See pts. VI-VII infra.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(aXl) (1970).
132. 501 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiazn).
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970).
134. See Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (Ist Cir. 1972). Plaintiffs brought class action
against a police department alleging police surveillance in violation of their constitutional rights
and requested injunctive relief. The court of appeals held that the denial of class status was
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Circuits 13 5 but was rejected by the District of Columbia Circuit in Williams
v. Mumford. 136 The Williams court relied on a 1966 Supreme Court decision,
Switzerland Cheese Association v. E. Horne's Market, Inc. 137 and found
section 1292(a)(1) inapplicable. 138 In Switzerland Cheese, the Court held that
a district court's order denying summary judgment to plaintiff in an action
seeking a permanent injunction was not an interlocutory order denying a
preliminary injunction appealable under section 1292(a)(1). Congressional
policy against piecemeal appeal would not be fostered by an order which
"does not settle or even tentatively decide anything about the merits of the claim.
It is strictly a pretrial order that decides only one thing-that the case should
go to trial."1 39 Williams, however, was an employment discrimination case,
analogous to Price. The district court had refused to certify the class. The
court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground, inter alia, 140 that section
1292(a)(1) was inapplicable, since the district court's order was not specifically
directed to the issue of injunctive relief. 41 The decision, however, contained
inconsistencies which leave its validity open to question. The court stated:
[I]t would appear that the Supreme Court in Switzerland Cheese has opted for a
narrow construction of the statutory language. Although an order denying class
action certification might at some later stage have an effect on the scope of equitable
relief, such orders "in no way touch on the merits of the claim" and thus fall outside
1 42
the scope of the section.

appealable under section 1292(a)(1) since, if plaintiff won on the merits, the injunction would
only prevent the surveillance of plaintiffs and not that of non-parties; it then found that the
district court's order had narrowed the scope of any possible injunctive relief.
135. Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1, 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962) (per
curiam). Black children and their parents brought an action against their school district, alleging
that it maintained a biracial school system. The court of appeals permitted appeal of an order
striking the class action allegations since the order effectively limited the scope of possible
injunctive relief to an order requiring admission of the named plaintiff to the school of his choice,
whereas the class had sought reorganization of the entire school system. Id. at 108. See Jones v.
Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 522
F.2d 1235, 1237-38 (7th Cir., 1975).
136. 511 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).
137. 385 U.S. 23 (1966).
138. 511 F.2d at 369.
139. 385 U.S at 25. One commentator has explained the rationale by stating: "[There is no
correlation between the need for immediate relief and the propriety of summary judgment ....[I]t
does not seem an undue procedural nicety to insist that the plaintiff amend his pleadings and seek
immediate relief by means of a preliminary injunction." Note, Appealability in the Federal
Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 370 (1961) (commenting on the court of appeals' opinions which
led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Switzerland Cheese).
140. The court also dismissed the appeal on the ground that neither the death knell nor
collateral order doctrines applied. 511 F.2d at 367-69. See note 33 supra.
141. 511 F.2d at 370-71.
142. Id., quoting Switzerland Cheese.
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Thus, if the court admits that the denial of class certification "might... have
an effect in the scope of equitable relief' it is difficult to understand why this
effect will take place "at some later stage" since the denial of the class
43
certification is the crucial order which affects the scope of the injunction.1
Moreover, the court relied on a Second Circuit decision, City of New York v.
InternationalPipe and Ceramics Corp., I" wherein the Second Circuit refused
145
to permit an appeal of a class action denial under section 1292(a)(1).
InternationalPipe is, however, clearly distinguishable from Williams since it
involved an action alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade. The Supreme
Court has recognized that "one injunction [against violations of the antitrust
laws] is as effective as 100."146 This is not the case, however, in class action
suits seeking injunctive relief in the area of deprivation of civil rights since the
individual relief accorded would not be broad enough to provide relief to the
potential class members.
In cases decided subsequent to Switzerland Cheese, courts have permitted
section 1292(a)(1) appeals where the scope of prospective injunctive relief was
narrowed by a district courts dismissal of some of the defendants 47 or by the
striking of allegations in an intervenor's complaint.' 48 Thus, additional
support for the use of section 1292(a)(1) in allowing appeal of district court
14 9
orders denying class certification can be found by analogy with these cases.
143. It is possible that the court was alluding to rule 23(c)(1) which gives the district court the
right to modify its class action order at any time. However, the only possible modification would
broaden the scope of injunctive relief from its present narrowest point. It would not be logical to
permit defendant to appeal a class certification which would broaden the scope of possible relief,
while refusing plaintiff the same right when the relief is narrowed.
While it is true that the district court may modify its order denying certification, one court has
analogized such modifiable orders to the denial of a temporary injunction without prejudice to an
application for its renewal, an order which is appealable. Spangler v. United States, 415 F.2d
1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 1969).
144. 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
145. Id. at 299.
146. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972). The International Pipe court,
recognizing this distinction, did not hold that section 1292(a)(1) would never be available in an
appeal of a class action denial. It simply stated that the discrimination cases were inapplicable.
410 F.2d at 299.
147. Build of Buffalo, Inc. v. Sedita, 441 F.2d 284, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1971); cf. Hartmann v.
Scott, 488 F.2d 1215, 1220 (8th Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit decision in Build of Buffalo would
seem to indicate that it would react favorably to a section 1292(a)(1) appeal of a class action
denial involving the issue of narrowing the scope of possible injunctive relief. But see Male v.
Crossroads Ass'n, 469 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1972). In 1Male, plaintiff welfare recipients alleged that
the rental agents in a privately owned but government-funded development denied them housing
solely because of their welfare status, in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The district court denied plaintiffs motion for certification of a class action. The
court of appeals held that the denial was not appealable since it was not the "death knell" of the
action. There was no discussion of the possibility of jurisdiction under section 1292(a)(1) although
this would seem to be an appropriate case for it. Id at 619 n.3.
148. Spangler v. United States, 415 F.2d 1242, 1246-48 (9th Cir. 1969) (the court distinguished Switzerland Cheese, but limited Spangler's holding to the facts of the case).
149. These cases are distinguishable from cases holding that a district court's dismissal of a
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Notwithstanding Williams, the better view is that refusal to certify a class
action where such denial would narrow the scope of requested injunctive
relief should be appealable by the plaintiff under section 1292(a)(1).1 50 Appeal
is probably unavailable in the converse situation-where defendant wishes to
appeal a class certification-since certification has no effect on the scope of the
injunctive relief requested.
V.
MANDAMUS UNDER SECTION 1651
The All Writs Act provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he Supreme Court
and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law."'u 5 The use of the writs, however, by the federal
courts is limited. They have been termed "drastic and extraordinary remedies,"' 5 2 and have traditionally been used "to confine inferior courts to the
exercise of their prescribed jurisdiction or to compel them to exercise their
authority when it is their duty to do so.' 5 3 However, "jurisdiction" is not to be
given a "technical" definition,' 54 but rather has been defined by the Supreme'
Court as a "judicial usurpation of power.' 55 Thus, the writ may issue when a
district court has exceeded the "sphere of its discretionary power"' 56 but
mandamus does not lie to review mere error. 57 Thus, where a district court
permissive counterclaim is not appealable, since the only effect of the dismissal is to oblige the
claimant to institute his own action. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
351, 370-71 (1961). In the cases discussed in this section which sought injunctive relief for a class,
the institution of actions by individual class members would not have the desired effect of ending
a pattern of illegal conduct.
150. Such cases will arise mainly where the plaintiff is seeking to represent a class under rule
23(b)(2) which provides that such an action is maintainable when "the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole. . . ." Orders which are purely procedural, such as those restraining or refusing to restrain
the parties from contacting class members, are not appealable. See, e.g., Siebert v. Great N.
Dev. Co., 494 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers
Int'l, Inc. 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970). The writs referred to include those of mandamus, prohibition
and common law certiorari. The petitioner may seek the different writs alternatively or cumulatively and the label attached to the section is unimportant. 9 Moore, supra note 51,
110.26
at 278-79, 282. The writ sought will hereinafter be referred to as mandamus.
152. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947).
153. United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 202 (1945).
154. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967).
155. Id., quoting De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945).
156. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1967).
157. Comment, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 595, 599 (1973); cf. A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., 365 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir 1966)
("Mandamus [lies] to redress a clear-cut abuse of discretion"). But see Note, Appealability in the
Federal Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 377 (1961) ("The rather tenuous distinction between 'mere'
error and 'abuse of discretion' provides the appellate courts with the opportunity to exercise their
extraordinary power whenever they consider immediate review appropriate.').
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making a class action determination applies the criteria of rule 23 to the facts, the
order is not reviewable by mandamus, absent a dear abuse of discretion.' 5
In 1957, the Supreme Court expanded the use of mandamus in La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co.' 5 9 There the issue was whether a court of appeals could
review by mandamus a district court's reference to a master of an entire
antitrust action. The Court, announcing its "supervisory mandamus" doctrine,
affirmed the court of appeals' issuance of the writ vacating the reference and
stated "that supervisory control of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals
is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system."' 60 Since
La Buy took note of the fact that Judge La Buy had referred eleven cases to
masters in the past six years,' 61 it would appear that the exercise of supervisory mandamus is limited to instances where the district court has repeatedly
indulged in the disapproved practice.' 62 Thus, in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. United States District Court,' 63 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
issued a writ of mandamus to vacate an order certifying a class relying, inter
alia, on La Buy. The court noted that this was the second time the district
court had reached the identical erroneous conclusion and it found a clear
abuse of discretion coupled with the district courts disregard of a previous
holding of the court of appeals. 1 6 4 McDonnell Douglas involved the certification of a class representing the next of kin of the 335 passengers who died
158. Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791, 793 (10th Cir. 1970) (order
certifying a class not reviewable by mandamus where there was no abuse of discretion; the
district court properly found common questions of fact and superiority of the class action device.);
accord, In re Cessna Aircraft Distributorship Antitrust Litig., 518 F.2d 213, 217 (8th Cir. 1975),
petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975) (No. 75-435) (writ refused to review
an order certifying a class where defendant alleged plaintiff would not adequately represent the
class: "absolutely no showing the district court abused its judicial power. ...
."); General Motors
Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1974) (writ refused to review an order
certifying a class where defendant alleged lack of common questions of law and fact.); Katz v.
Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 752 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (in
discussing the availability of mandamus to review a class action determination, affirmative or
negative, the court stated "if the court has acted within its jurisdiction pursuant to appropriate
procedural safeguards and in a nonarbitrary manner, mandamus will not lie." (citations omitted).
The court permitted appeal of the class action certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)). Hackett
v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972) (writ refused to
review a district court order finding a class of 1 million unmanageable); Interpace Corp. v. City
of Philadelphia, 438 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1971) (writ refused to review a district court certification of
a class where defendant contended, inter alla, that there were conflicts of interest between class
members and that the district court breached its duty in not making findings to support its
ruling). But see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. CL, 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 11
(9th Cir. 1975), discussed at notes 163-66 infra and accompanying texL
159. 352 U.S. 249 (1957); see C. Wright, Federal Courts § 102, at 462 (2d ed. 1970).
160. 352 U.S. at 259-60.
161. Id. at 258.
162. See Comment, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 Harv.
L. Rev. 595, 610 (1973).
163. 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 11 (9th Cir. 1975). This appears to be the only case where a writ
of mandamus has issued to vacate a class action determination.
164. Id. at 12.
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in the crash of a Turkish Airlines plane in France. The court of appeals held
that certification of the class under rule 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) was a
clear abuse of discretion 16 since none of these subdivisions permitted certifications of a class whose members had independent tort claims arising out
66
of the same occurrence where damages constituted the only relief sought. 1
The Supreme Court, in 1964 in Schlagenhauf v. Holder,167 announced the
doctrine of what has been termed "advisory mandamus.' 6 Schlagenhaqf
involved the validity and construction of rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as applied to a defendant in a negligence action, a question of
first impression. The Court stated:
The meaning of Rule 35's requirements of "in controversy" and "good cause" also
raised issues of first impression. In our view, the Court of Appeals should have also,

under these special circumstances, determined the "good cause" issue,
so as to avoid
69
piecemeal litigation and to settle new and important problems.1

Although the Schlagenhaufdoctrine of advisory mandamus has not yet been
utilized by the courts to review a class action determination, it should be
available in an appropriate case, since170the courts have relied on Schlagenhaqf
to review issues of first impression.
Since the Supreme Court has often stated that mandamus is not to be used
as a substitute for appeals, 17 it has been suggested that where appeal may lie
under section 1292(b), 172 a party may not petition for mandamus until its
request for certification has been denied. 173 Although it has been suggested
that mandamus would be appropriate to review a refusal of a section 1292(b)
certificate, 174 the better view would be that it should not be used except to
165. Id.
166. Id. at 11-12. Although rule 23(bX3) would seem the appropriate subdivision under which
to certify an action such as this, the Advisory Committee Notes to rule 23 specifically stated that
mass accident litigation would not be appropriate for rule 23(b)(3) treatment. 39 F.R.D. 69, 103
(1966). However, there is no discussion of the appropriateness of rule 23(b)(3) in the court of
appeals opinion.
167. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
168. See Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 595, 613 (1973).
169. 379 U.S. at 111.
170. See Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 595, 616-19 (1973) and cases cited therein; cf. Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517,
524 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (the court found that additional requirements had to be met: the
forestallment of future error in the trial courts and the aid of efficient judicial administration).
171. E.g., Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947); United States Alkali Export Ass'n v.
United States, 325 U.S. 196, 203 (1945); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
172. See pt. III supra.
173. See A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., 365 F.2d 439, 442 (2d Cir. 1966) (review of a
transfer order is appropriate by mandamus rather than under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)); 9 Moore,
supra note 51,
110.22[5], at 267. Professor Moore also suggests that if review of a question of law is sought, section 1292(b) would be appropriate, but if review of "abuse of
discretion" is sought, the section is inappropriate and should not be sought since no controlling
question of law is involved. Id. But see notes 98-101, 114 supra and accompanying text.
174. See Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 382 (1961); 17 Vill.
L. Rev. 962, 976 (1972).
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review the order for which the certificate was sought. 17s To hold otherwise
would contravene the requirements of section 1292(b), that both
the district
76
court and the court of appeals must agree to the review.'
While mandamus is available to review a class action determination, it has
been used sparingly by the courts. 17 7 It is available when the district court has
not proceeded in a procedurally correct manner in applying the standards of
rule 23, or has clearly abused its discretion.' 78 In addition the more recent
doctrines of supervisory and advisory mandamus are also available to the
79
parties.

1

VI.

RULE 54(b) AS AN ALTERNATIVE

Rule 54(b) has been urged as an alternative method of appeal of an order
denying class certification. The rule permits the district court judge, in his
discretion, to certify an order as final and hence appealable in an action
involving multiple claims or multiple parties when a decision final as to less
than all the claims or parties is entered and the district court feels there is no
just reason for delaying an appeal. 80o To fall within the purview of the rule,
the claim must be capable of being decided "independently" of other claims,
although it may arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the other
claims.' 8 1 Moreover, rule 54(b) "scrupulously recognizes the statutory requirement of a 'final decision' under § 1291 as a basic requirement for an
appeal . . . ,,182
While, absent the death knell situation, a refusal to certify a class action is
not a final decision under section 1291,183 the Third Circuit, without analysis,
has indicated that the denial of a class action certification can be appealed if
rule 54(b) procedures are followed.'8 4 However, its use creates conceptual
175. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); 9
Moore, supra note 51,
110.22[3], at 262.
176. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
177. See note 163 supra.
178. See note 158 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 159-66 supra and accompanying te.xL
180. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides in pertinent part: "When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. . . ."
181. Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'r. & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 452 (1956);
Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 360 (1961).
182. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956).
183. See pt. H1supra.
184. Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 1974); Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 752 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); Hackett
v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 623 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972); Hayes v.
Sealtest Foods Div., 396 F.2d 448, 449 (3d Cir. 1968) (per curiam). In none of these cases were
the courts actually presented with a rule 54(b) certification; therefore their advocacy of the use of
rule 54(b) is in the nature of dicta. The Sixth Circuit permitted such an appeal from the
dismissal of derivative action counts of a complaint in Nolen v. Shaw-Walker Co., 449 F.2d 506
(6th Cir. 1971), without discussion. The district court had also certified dismissal of the class
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problems. There has been little discussion of whether an appeal of a denial of
a class action certification pursuant to rule 54(b) is an order involving multiple
"claims" or multiple "parties." It has been suggested that the class action
85
denial is an order striking the claims for relief' of absent class members. 186
Another interpretation would be that the class members should be considered
parties prior to the certification, thus making the denial of certification
tantamount to dismissal of less than all the parties. However, neither interpretation is satisfactory. A situation analogous to appeal of a class action
denial is that of a denial of permissive intervention. 87 When a petitioner for
intervention has been denied the right to intervene, he has been denied only a
procedural right. His claim for relief has not been disposed of. 188 This is also
true of the class members, who now have the right to bring their own actions.
Moreover, although for certain purposes, a suit filed as a class action is
presumed to be one before district court certification, 189 potential class
action allegations, but the plaintiff chose not to appeal on that issue. Id. at 508. One district court
has certified a class action denial for appeal under rule 54(b), finding that "this order... is a final
judgment [as to the absent class members]". Wyndham v. American Brands, Inc., BNA Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. No. 734, at E-1, 8 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 1975).
185. "Claim for relief" in rule 54(b) has been defined as "the aggregate of operative facts
which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts." Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 401
F.2d 510, 512 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam), quoting Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre,
Inc., 133 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1943).
186. 9 Moore, supra note 51,
110.13[9], at 186.
187. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and (b) set forth the requirements for intervention of right and
permissive intervention: '(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parites. (b) Permissive Intervention.
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of
the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action
relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal
or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement
issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely
application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall
consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties."
188. 6 Moore, supra note 51, 54.38, at 641. "[Rjule [54(b)] refers only to claims in the sense
of the substantive right being asserted . . . rather than requests that are incidental to the
procedure for obtaining a judicial award and enforcing it." 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2658, at 71 (1973).
189. E.g., City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1971)
(assume a suit is a class action for purposes of determining jurisdiction, prior to class certification); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1967)
(assume a suit is a class action for purposes of dismissal or compromise).
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members cannot be considered parties since they are not bound by the
outcome of the suit unless the class is certified.' 90
Although a denial of permissive intervention is generally considered a
nonappealable final order, absent abuse of discretion,'19 and although it has
been suggested that rule 54(b) certification of such an order would be
inappropriate, 1 9 2 the Tenth Circuit recently permitted, without analysis, a
rule 54(b) appeal of a denial of permissive intervention. 193 Finding that "[tlhe
general rule . . . that interlocutory orders from which no appeal lies are

merged into the final judgment and open to review on appeal from that
judgment,"1 94 the court also reviewed the district court's denial of the class
action certification.
In addition to the multiple claim and multiple party requirements of rule
54(b), the courts must also adhere to the finality test of section 1291.195 Thus
class action denials are only appealable under rule 54(b) in a death knell
situation. Oddly enough, the Third Circuit which rejected the death knell
doctrine, advocates permitting appeals under rule 54(b). Thus, it is apparently
ignoring the fact that if it regards death knell situations as not meeting the
requirements of the final decision rule, then rule 54(b) would also not permit
appeal.
CL Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States Dist. CL, 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1
The court vacated the district court order which was designed to notify potential
plaintiffs of the action, which had been brought as a class action. The court stated '"slo long as
the persons sought to be notified do not become parties to these actions, they wil not be bound by
the outcome." Id. at 5.
24.15, at 561-62; 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
191. 3B Moore, supra note 51
Practice and Procedure § 1923, at 627 (1972). Both commentators criticize this rule and suggest
that denials of both permissive intervention and intervention as of right under rule 24(a) (see note
187 supra) should be appealable under section 1291. The rationale is that unless the intervenor as
of right is permitted to intervene his rights will be unduly affected (see 6 Moore, supra note 51,
190.

(9th Cir. 1975).

54.38, at 643) while the permissive intervenor has alternative remedies (see 3B Moore, supra
note 51,
24.15 at 564).
54.38, at 642-43.
192. 6 Moore, supra note 51,
193. Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975).
194. Id. at 1077. The general rule referred to permits review of a nonappealable interlocutory
order on appeal from an appealable order or a final judgment. Skirvin v. Mesta. 141 F.2d 668
(10th Cir. 1944); cf. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 1968). cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969). However, Professor Moore states: 'f\V]here an interlocutory order is properly
appealed and review is sought of an incidental discretionary order, the appeallate court should
not review the discretionary order where there is no showing of an abuse of discretion." 9 Moore,
supra note 51,
110.2511], at 272. The Second Circuit has held "the guiding principle" to be
"whether review of the appealable order will involve consideration of factors relevant to the
otherwise nonappealable order." General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 648
(2d Cir. 1974).
Thus, another avenue of appeal would appear to lie when appeal is taken of a denial of
intervention as of right, with the court of appeals taking pendent jurisdiction of the class action
denial.
195. See pt. II supra.
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Rule 54(b) arguably does not permit a plaintiff to appeal an order denying
class certification. Moreover, its use is discretionary with the district court
which, in addition to meeting the above requirements, must also find "no just
reason for delay.' 1 96 Rule 54(b) clearly should not be available to a defendant
seeking the right to appeal a class certification. 97
VII.

DISMISSAL OF THE ENTIRE COMPLAINT

In Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young & Co., ' 98 the district court dismissed with
leave to amend plaintiffs complaint alleging a class action. Plaintiffs refused
to amend and judgment was entered dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
Appeal of the judgment was obtained and, thus, review of the class action
determination. Rule 41(b), which permits defendants to move for dismissal for

failure of the plaintiff to prosecute, would have the same effect.1 99
This is however a drastic method of obtaining appeal of a class action
denial since the dismissal acts as an adjudication on the merits and the
plaintiff is taking an all or nothing risk that the district court's order will be
reversed. However, where the plaintiffs claim is so small that he would not
20 0
continue without class status, and where no other avenue for appeal exists,
this risk becomes irrelevant.
VIIi.

CONSEQUENCES OF DENYING APPEAL

Where certification has been denied and plaintiffs appeal of that order is
dismissed, in the circuits which do not recognize the death knell doctrine, or
the modified version of it, denial of appeal may, for all practical purposes,
terminate the litigation. 20 1 Plaintiff, as well as potential class members with
similarly small claims, will not have the opportunity to have the merits of the
case heard, nor will the validity of the class action determination ever be
tested. When the death knell situation does not exist, and plaintiff continues
on his own to a decision on the merits, the question of whether the class
action determination will be reviewed may well depend on which party was
196. The following are among the factors which should be taken into account by the district
court when it determines that there is "no just reason for delay": weighing the policies of the final
decision rule against the exigencies of the case at hand; independence between the adjudicated
and unadjudicated claims; the possibility that the need for review might be mooted by future
developments in the trial court and whether hearing the appeal might delay the trial without
having the positive effect of simplifying it. 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2659, at 77-80 (1973).
197. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 752 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied; 419
U.S. 885 (1974); cf. In re Cessna Aircraft Distributorship Antitrust Litig., 518 F.2d 213, 216 (8th
Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975) (No. 75-435).
198. 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944).
199. Under rule 41(b) defendant has control over whether to move for dismissal. He can delay
his motion while the statute of limitations runs against the class members. Note, Interlocutory
Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1292, 1298 (1970).
200. In the Third and Seventh Circuits, which have rejected the death knell doctrine, absent
a writ of mandamus or section 1292(b) certification by the district court, this would be the only
method by which the small claim plaintiff could continue his suit. See pt. III supra.
201. See pt. II supra.
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successful on the merits. If plaintiff is not successful on the merits, he will
most likely appeal the judgment as well as the class action determination.
Where, however, a plaintiff is successful on the merits, a successful appeal by
him of the adverse class determination may result in the court of appeals
ordering a new trial on the merits:
For ... it may conclude ...

that it would be improper merely to order that notice

pursuant to rule 23(c)(2) be sent to the members of the class without a new trial, since
such a disposition of the appeal would permit members of the class to make their
decision whether to join in the action at a time when they already know its
outcome-a form of "one-way"
intervention that the 1966 amendments (to rule 231
20 2
were designed to prevent
Thus, a successful plaintiff may not wish to appeal the denial of certification
if it would mean a reversal. However, at least one judge has asserted that the
reversal on appeal of the denial of the class would not permit reopening of the
judgment on the merits. 20 3 Such a holding would result in unfairness to
defendants who had conducted the trial in the expectation of a smaller
liability, 20 4 or it would result in defendants expending large sums in defending
small claims in all cases where class actions have been denied in order to
protect themselves against the possibility of a class certification being made on
appeal. 205
Another possible result of a denial of class action certification is a proliferation of law suits by potential class members. The purpose of rule 23(b)(3) is
to "achieve economies of time, effort, and expense ....-206 A wrongful denial
of class certification by the district court and the resultant lawsuits of
potential class members would defeat this purpose of rule 23(b)(3) if immediate appeal of the determination were not allowed. Such lawsuits are
more probable if plaintiff is successful on the merits, 20 7 and the defendant
202. Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action Allegations. 70 Colum. L.
Rev. 1292, 1294 (1970), citing Advisory Comm. Note, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39
F.R.D. 69, l05 (1966). Although a new trial may be the result of a successful appeal of class
action denial, as a practical matter, plaintiffs attorney may urge such an appeal since his fee is,
in most cases, contingent on the size of the recovery.
203. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 628 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, I., dissenting),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
204. See Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 Colum.
L. Rev. 1292, 1294 (1972).
205. 455 F.2d at 628 (Rosenn, J.,dissenting). Judge Rosenn finds it "inconceivable that either
the lawyers or the court will give a $9.00 suit the same consideration and attention due a class
action involving hundreds of thousands of persons and many millions of dollars in potential
damages." Id.
206. Advisory Comm. Note, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03
(1966).
207. The Supreme Court's decision in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. S38
(1974) lengthened the period of time during which a defendant may be subject to the lawsuit by
holding that the commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute as to all asserted class
members who make timely motions to intervene after the district court has denied class
certification. Id. at 553. It follows that the statute is also tolled when the asserted class member
seeks to file his own action. See 15 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1010, 1027-28 (1974).
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would face not only the costs of litigating numerous actions, but also the

20 9
of the original
possible effects of stare decisis 20 8 and/or collateral estoppel

plaintiffs case.
Denying defendant an immediate appeal of an affirmative class action
certification may also frustrate or preclude review of the district court's class
findings. Possible serious consequences for class members may result. If the
plaintiff is not successful on the merits, and does not appeal the adverse final
judgment, members of the class are bound by that judgment 210 unless they
can successfully obtain collateral review, in this instance, on the ground of
inadequate representation by the class representative. 2 11 If the plaintiff were
successful on the merits, the defendant would probably appeal the class action
determination when he appeals on the merits. In the event the class action
certification is reversed on appeal, plaintiff would have suffered since at least
208. Stare decisis concerns only rules of law. The doctrine applies when a court establishes a
certain rule of law to be applied by it and by all courts owing obedience to it in all subsequent
litigation where such a rule is relevant. See 1B Moore, supra note 51, T 0.401, at 11.
209. Traditionally, collateral estoppel prevents a litigant from invoking the conclusive effect
of a judgment unless he would have been bound had the judgment gone the other way. 113Moore,
supra note 51, 0.4i2[1], at 1801. However, several courts and commentators have found that
where the plaintiff, a stranger to the original action, is suing a defendant who was a party to the
original action, the plaintiff may offensively assert the original judgment against the defendant,
on the theory that defendant has already had his day in court. See generally Note, Collateral
Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1499-1501 (1974). But see 1B Moore, supra note
0.412[1l], at 1809. Defendant may not, however, assert a judgment favorable to himself
51,
against a plaintiff who was not a party to the original action since the plaintiff has not had his
is always a
"day in court," a due process requirement. Id., 0.411[1], at 1252. However "lilt
prerequisite to the invocation of collateral estoppel that the issue determined in the prior action be
identical to the issue whose litigation is sought to be estopped." Note, Collateral Estoppel of
Nonparties, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1499 (1974).
210. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) provides: "The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (bX3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was
directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class."
211. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) provides that a prerequisite of granting class action status is that
"the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." In
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), the Supreme Court found that there would be a failure of
due process where the procedures adopted did not insure the protection of the absent parties, but
that absent parties could be bound by a judgment where they were adequately represented. Id. at
42-43. In Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), the court held that where the class
representative in the original class suit failed to appeal an order which granted retroactive relief
to the plaintiff, but not to the class, the class representative's failure to prosecute an appeal on
behalf of other members of the class rendered his representation of them inadequate. Id. at 69.
See generally Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 589 (1974).
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in a rule 23(b)(3) class action, notice212
must be sent to all class members, with
notice costs borne by the plaintiff.
The Herbst213 court is apparently the only court which has held the
certification of a class action to be immediately appealable. Although the
court recited the Second Circuit tripartite test, 214 it relied on the third factor,

irreparable harm to the defendant, and added an additional factor, judicial
efficiency, in permitting the appeal. 21 5 The court found that defendants often
will spend large amounts of money defending class actions because of the
"enormous" damages sought. Defendants often are pressured into settling the
action once the class is certified, even though the validity of plaintiffs claims
is doubtful, because of the enormous potential liability to the class. Finally, it
found that judicial efficiency would be served since the district courts must
expend more time in supervising class actions than would be required in
individual cases. 21 6 These possible consequences led the court to hold that it
had jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the certification. 2 17 The validity of this
rationale is, however, open to question. Although several commentators,2 1 as
well as a study sponsored by the American College of Trial Lawyers, 2 19 have
asserted that defendants are pressured into settling once the class is certified,
the more reasonable view would seem to be that, when a frivolous class action
suit is brought, defendant, which is usually a substantial business organization, would prefer to litigate than to settle. 220 This point of view is borne
out by a more recent study of class actions, sponsored by the Staff of the
212. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974), the
Supreme Court held that the cost of notice to class members must be borne by the plaintiff.
213. Herbst v. ITT, 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974); see notes 36-52 supra and accompanying
text.
214. 495 F.2d at 1312.
215. Id. at 1312-13.
216. Id. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) requires the district court to approve settlements and Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(d) gives it the power to issue orders determining the course of the proceedings and
protecting class members.
217. 495 F.2d at 1312-13.
218. See, e.g., Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1971) (describing the class action suit as a "form of legalized
blackmail'); Simon, Class Actions--Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 388-89
(1973).
219. American College of Trial Lawyers, Report and Recommendations of the Special
Committee on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 15-17 (1972) (hereinafter referred
to as ACTL Study). Attorneys representing class action plaintiffs have criticized this report as not
being disinterested, alleging that its authors are mainly defense attorneys. Patrick & Cherner,
Rule 23 and the Class Action for Damages: A Reply to the Report of the American College of
Trial Lawyers, 28 Bus. Law. 1097 (1973). Judge Weinstein found the recommendations of the
report "premature." Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58
F.RID. 299, 306 (1973). The Herbst court, however, relied on it in its decision. 49S F.2d at 1313.
220. Rosenfeld, The Impact of Class Actions on Corporate and Securities Law, 1972 Duke
L.J. 1167, 1190.
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Senate Commerce Committee. 22' This study found that 55 percent of the
completed class action cases covered by the study were disposed of in favor of
the defendant, either by summary judgment or dismissal. Thus the authors

concluded that "the class action is not a very effective tool for forcing

settlements. '222 In addition, defendants' attorneys who were interviewed
stated that they would litigate a weak suit on the merits rather than settle the
claim. 223 And, as Judge Weinstein has pointed out, the trial judge may use his
discretion to "reduce the effect of possible abuse" when presented with
settlement proposals. 224 The Senate Study also cast doubt on the assertion
that class action litigation takes up a disproportionate amount of district court
time. It noted that "most class actions do not take markedly longer from filing
to disposition in district court than do civil actions in general. ' 22 Moreover,
in an analogous situation, interlocutory review of a denial of a motion for
summary judgment or of an order granting a motion for a new trial is not
available, although reversal of these orders would save the district court the
burden of an unnecessary trial. 226 Therefore, although both parties will
undoubtedly incur larger expenses in prosecuting the suit in the event the
class is certified, 227 the impact of the other two factors relied on by the Herbst
court to permit appeal, judicial efficiency and settlement pressure, does not
appear to be as great as feared by the Herbst court.
Thus denial of the right to appeal the class action determination may result
in: termination of the lawsuit in the death knell situation, absence of appellate
review of the class action determination, increased expenses of the parties and
a possible decrease in judicial efficiency due to proliferation of lawsuits and
longer trials.
These consequences must be weighed against the principles underlying the
final judgment rule. The fact that interlocutory appeal of orders denying
summary judgment 228 is not permitted demonstrates that burdens on the
judicial efficiency and increased expenses to litigants are not factors sufficient
to overcome the finality principle. Absence of appellate review of the class
action determination is also not a compelling reason for permitting interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court has held that "the right to a judgment
221.

Senate Study, supra note 52, at G-1.

222.
223.

Id. at G-3.
Id.

224. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 302
(1973).
225. Senate Study, supra note 52, at G-4. But see Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d
650 (2d Cir. 1975) where the court stated: "The actual and potential burdens of the trial judge in
the maintenance and supervision of large class actions are colossal, and immediate review of class
designations would relieve the trial judge of these responsibilities in cases found to be inappropriate upon interlocutory appeal." Id. at 654.
226. Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 654 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975); see Comment,
Collateral Orders and Extraordinary Writs as Exceptions to the Finality Rule, 51 Nw. U.L. Rev.
746, 750 (1957).
227. See note 218 supra and accompanying text.
228. See text accompanying note 226 supra.
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from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient
of justice ... .- 229 Numerous district court orders incidental to the litigation
are never reviewed.2 30 Although the consequences of such a lack of appellate
review may be inconsistent district court decisions, 231 policies behind the final
judgment rule would seem to outweigh this disadvantage. Most compelling of
these policies are the delay caused by such interlocutory appeals,2 32 the
burden on appellate dockets, 233 and the impairment of the confidence of
litigants and the public in the decisions of the trial courts.2 34 Creation of
additional judicial exceptions to the finality rule to permit early appeals of
class action determinations would undoubtedly increase litigation on the
appealability of interlocutory orders. 235 An excellent example of this is the
large number of appeals of class action determinations which followed the
Eisen I decision. The death knell situation is the one instance in which appeal
of a class action determination 236 is essential, since the denial of the certification in effect terminates the litigation. Most circuits have correctly allowed
immediate appeal of such an order. The Third and Seventh Circuits might well
reconsider their rejection of the doctrine. In all other instances of class
determinations, however, the presently available methods of appeal would
237
appear sufficient.
Joyce E. Margulies
229. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
230. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 352 (1961).
231. Id.
232. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 325 (1940).
233. From 1962-1972, there was an increase of more than 200 percent in appeals filed in the
courts of appeals. Ann. Rep. of the Director, Admin. Off. of the United States Courts, 87 (1974).
See generally Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542 (1969).
234. Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 751, 781
(1957).
235. One commentator has stated. "There is one thing to be said in favor of no restrictions
at all (on appeals]--it will save an immense amount of useless litigation over the question whether
parties may or may not appeal particular cases. ... Machinery to save labor may become so
complex as to waste more labor than it saves." Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5
Texas L. Rev. 126, 127 (1927).
236. It is interesting to note, however, that interlocutory appeals were sought in only three
of the one hundred twenty District of Columbia Circuit cases surveyed by the Senate Study. Senate
Study, supra note 52, at G-4. The death knell situation may also arise when the plaintiff who
sought to represent the class has a large enough claim to continue alone when class certification is
denied, but potential class members, having small claims, may exist, for whom the denial spells
"the death knell." It has been suggested that such plaintiffs can bring their own dass suits and
when class certification is denied, gain appeal under the "death knell" doctrine, 39 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 403, 418 (1972).
237. Profesor Moore agrees with the resistance to the extension of judicially created exceptions to the final judgment rule, finding that section 1292(b) and the "still evolving doctrine of
supervisory mandamus" are preferable methods of appeal. 9 Moore, supra note 51, 110.10. at
136. See also, Comment, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 Texas L Rev. 292, 320 (1966).
But see Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L.
Rev. 89, 128 (1975) (urging an expanded interpretation of finality).

